Almost everyone recognizes that cyberspace is a fact of daily life. Given its ubiquity, scale, and scope, cyberspace – including the Internet and its management, the billions of computers it connects, and the experiences it enables—has become a central feature of the world we live in. It has created a fundamentally new reality for almost everyone in the developed world and rapidly growing numbers of people in the developing world.
Until recently, cyberspace was considered largely a matter of low politics—a term used to denote background conditions and routine decisions and processes. While nationalism, political participation, political contention, conflict, violence, and war are traditionally viewed as matters of high politics, it is now evident that cyberspace and its uses have vaulted into the highest realm of high politics.
Our research initiatives summarized below focus on a set of projects that, individually and collectively, shape our understanding of cyberpolitics to date. What follows is a brief note on each project and, as relevant, related initiatives.
Many features of cyberspace are reshaping contemporary international relations theory, policy, and practice. Those related to time, space, permeation, fluidity, participation, attribution, accountability, and ubiquity are the most serious. The pervasive, often nontransparent, interconnections afforded by cyberspace challenge traditional understandings of leverage and influence, international relations and power politics, national security, borders, and boundaries—as well as a host of other concepts and their corresponding realities.
At the same time, information and communication—foundations of all human societies and social interactions—have been afforded rather limited attention in the social sciences more generally, and in the domain of International Relations and Political Science, most notably. Despite the centrality of all forms of virtual information exchange—in all contexts and cultures, conditions, or situations—content, communication, conduits and forms of connectivity remain more marginal than is appropriate in our world today. The problem is that we have, as of yet, no persuasive theory or method to address the new reality shaped by cyberspace—with the Internet at its core—and its increasing pervasiveness in nearly all domains of activity.
Framing the Challenge
The problem is shown in the Figure below, where the question mark signals a powerful knowledge-challenge and research imperative. This figure shaped the research collaboration between a political scientist and a computer scientist. It also presented a set of model-based empirical analyses for capturing the complexities and interactions of the "virtual" and the "real" domains in different contexts and at different levels of analysis.
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| Cyberspace and international relations. Source: Choucri and Clark (2019, 5). |
Cyberpolitics in international relations
(2012) provides a baseline for subsequent research and a foundation for situating the cyber domain in the analysis of international relations. By developing lateral pressure theory further to encompass cyber venues and help explore behavior in cyberspace, we highlight the enabling power of cyber access for states and non-state actors alike, as well as the ways in which this new cyber power shapes interactions between nations.
Over a long period of time the research results led to the "full" framework presented in International relations in the cyber age: The co-evolution dilemma (2019), with David Clark. It is anchored in the intersection of the layers of the Internet and the levels of analysis in international relations, thus defining a joint system.
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| Select highlights of emergent cyber-IR theory. Note: All entries are illustrative. See figure above for reference. Source: Choucri and Clark (2019, 352). |
The The Co-Evolution Dilemma is the subtitle for International Relations in the Cyber Age (Choucri and Clark, 2018). This dilemma is shaped by the differential rates of change of two systems, cyberspace and international relations, as well as differentials in rates of change for their constitutive elements—which creates realities and uncertainties that are particularly difficult to anticipate and especially difficult to regulate.
Of the many challenges for quantitative analysis of lateral pressure theory, three emerge as singularly powerful at this state of our investigations. The first pertains to empirical identification of state profile in the traditional international system as well as in the cyber arena since we cannot assume a condition of profile congruence. The second is measuring propensity for expansion, that is, lateral pressure, in the real world and in cyberspace. And the third is about the matter of identifying congruence for state profiles and for lateral pressure with respect to these two very different arenas of interactions.
In the social sciences, we know that "time" is a very important, even defining, factor. But we have not yet developed the analytics or the evidence-base for understanding when, how, why and in what ways the factor of "time" matters. Nor have we fully appreciated the potential manipulability of the time factor in policy analysis.
The temporal issue is also multifaceted, with diverse time constraints, authority systems, operational mechanisms, formal and informal rules, and actors and entities – with all of the contentions thereof – creating sustained challenges for all actors, formal and informal, established or emerging.
We can now consider two questions central to investigations of lateral pressure and cyber space. First, do state profiles in the cyber domain mirror those in the real domain? Second, is state propensity to extend its behavior in the cyber domain congruent with its propensity for expansion in the real domain? These questions require metrics for identifying state profile in traditional international relations as well as cyberspace. These questions also require measures of the propensity for expansion in each of the traditional system as well as in cyberspace.
"Real" vs. Cyber - State Profile
In lateral pressure theory, the master variables—population, resource and technology—constitute the basis for identifying the state profile and to calculate a state’s profile type. The concept of profile was first developed early on with respect to the real world, as defined here. But it was not entirely clear how to move from concept to measurement. Recognizing that at each point in time, a state is characterized by one set of “master variables” that define the empirical parameters of the polity and provide the basis for policy agenda as well (Choucri and North 1987, 205–208), it soon became evident that normalizing each master variable to a share of the global total for that variable provides a simple and replicable approach to understanding not only the position of an individual state, but to shifts in the global total for any variable. Accordingly, the normalization technique used is country’s global share in the measures of population, resource and technology.
Thus, we define Pi,j, Ri,j, and Ti,j as population-, resource- and technology- master variables for country i at time j respectively as follows:
where,
pi,j, ri,j, and ti,j are the measures of population, resource and technology respectively for country i in year j.
In short, normalization allows the master variables to have the same order of magnitude and are independent of their units of measure. This step ensures that the profiles of differ ent states are comparable and meaningful.
| Cyber State Profile (Real state profile in parenthesis) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R>P>T (I) | P>R>T (II) | P>T>R (III) | R>T>P (IV) | T>R>P (V) | T>P>R (VI) |
| Australia (IV) | Afghanistan (I) | Vietnam (II) | Costa Rica (III) | Austria (VI) | Latvia (IV) |
| Bangladesh (III) | Algeria (I) | Italy (VI) | Barbados2 (VI) | Norway (V) | |
| Benin (II) | Angola (I) | Japan (VI) | Belgium (VI) | ||
| Brazil (IV) | Antigua & Barbuda2 (VI) | Portugal (VI) | Bermuda2 (VIc) | ||
| Bulgaria (II) | Argentina (I) | Spain (VI) | Canada (IV) | ||
| Burkina Faso1(II) | Azerbaijan (III) | United States (V) | Denmark (VI) | ||
| Burundi (II) | Bahamas, The (V) | Estonia (IV) | |||
| Cambodia1 (II) | Bahrain1 (VIa) | France (VI) | |||
| China (III) | Belize (I) | Germany (VI) | |||
| Cote d’Ivoire2 (II) | Bhutan (I) | Hong Kong SAR, China (VI) | |||
| Croatia (VI) | Bolivia (I) | Hungary (VI) | |||
| El Salvador (III) | Brunei Darussalam (VI) | Iceland (IV) | |||
| Ethiopia3 (II) | Cameroon (I) | Ireland (VI) | |||
| Ghana2 (II) | Chile (IV) | Israel (VI) | |||
| Greece (VI) | Colombia (I) | Korea, Rep. (VI) | |||
| Grenada2 (III) | Cyprus (VI) | Luxembourg (VI) | |||
| Indonesia (II) | Djibouti (Ia) | Malta (VI) | |||
| Lithuania (V) | Dominica2 (III) | Mauritius (III) | |||
| Macao SAR, China (VI) | Dominican Republic (III) | Netherlands (VI) | |||
| Moldova (II) | Fiji (I) | Singapore (VI) | |||
| Nepal (II) | Guyana (I) | Slovenia (VI) | |||
| New Zealand (V) | India (III) | Switzerland (VI) | |||
| Romania (III) | Jamaica (III) | Thailand (III) | |||
| Senegal1 (II) | Kazakhstan (IV) | United Kingdom (VI) | |||
| Serbia (II) | Kyrgyz Republic (I) | ||||
| Sierra Leone1 (II) | Lebanon (III) | ||||
| Sri Lanka (III) | Maldives5 (III) | ||||
| Tanzania (II) | Oman (IVa) | ||||
| Togo (II) | Panama (V) | ||||
| Uruguay (IV) | Paraguay (I) | ||||
| Peru (I) | |||||
| Qatar (VI) | |||||
| Russian Federation (IV) | |||||
| Saudi Arabia (IV) | |||||
| South Africa (I) | |||||
| South Sudan1 (Ia) | |||||
| St. Kitts and Nevis2 (VI) | |||||
| St. Lucia2 (III) | |||||
| St. Vincent & the Grenadines2 (III) | |||||
| Sudan (I) | |||||
| Trinidad & Tobago (VI) | |||||
| Turkey (VI) | |||||
| Tuvalu2 (III) | |||||
| Vanuatu (I) | |||||
| Venezuela, RB2 (IVc) | |||||
| Yemen, Rep. (I) | |||||
| Zambia (I) | |||||
| Zimbabwe (I) | |||||
| Source: Choucri and Clark (2019). Note: Cyber state profile is for year 2015 unless noted by an identifier: 12014; 22013; 32012; 52010. Real state profile, indicated in roman numerals in parenthesis, is for year 2016 unless noted by an identifier: a2015; c2013. |
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Given the recent construction of the cyber domain and the absence of compelling precedents, the matter of metrics will remain with us for some time to come. We now turn to metrics and measure for lateral pressure.
"Real" vs. Cyber - Lateral Pressure
Recall that the empirical work for the five phases of lateral pressure research summarized above tends to view expansion in terms of actual behavior (rather than the propensity for expansion).The difference is nuanced, but important: Behavior metrics are recorded after the fact. They usually reflect capability as well as intent. While this is consistent with the theory, it bypasses the thorny problem of metricizing the propensity factor first, and only then of examining connections to actual behavior. It also prevents us from exploring the potential gap or difference between propensity and behavior—and the implications thereof.
More recently, we developed the Lateral Pressure Index to quantify the propensity for expansion and, to the extent possible, to highlight the relative salience of the individual drivers. After some experimental efforts, we framed the LP Index, for a country i at time j,as a function of the geometric mean of the master variables:
where
Pi,j, and Ti,j, Ri,j are the measures of population, resource and technology respectively for country i in year j.
We can now turn to a couple of additional questions explored in the sixth phase of lateral pressure investigations: Does the propensity to expand in the real domain similar or different to that in the cyber arena? Are the driving master variables similar or different?
Lateral Pressure in Real Domain
We begin with the distribution of countries ranked by their real LP Index and identify their profile type as shown in figure below. Several results stand out:
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| States ordered by real lateral pressure index and identified by real profile, 2016. Source: Choucri and Clark (2019). |
China ranks highest in the propensity of expansion in the real domain, followed by the United States, and then India. For China and India, as well as for Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, and others, the propensity for expansion is driven more by population than by resources or technology. It is perhaps to be expected that technology is dominant in shaping lateral pressure for the United States, as well as Japan, Germany, France, and others. And resources are the critical drivers of lateral pressure for Brazil, Russia, Canada, Australia, and Iran.
Lateral Pressure in Cyber Domain
Then, too, we must note that early on in the emergence of cyberpolitics we had a tendency to consider the "real" domain and the cyber domain as distinct and separate entities. Over time, and with considerable investigation, we now appreciate that the "real" and cyber domains are not distinct, but rather interconnected and interdependent—shaped by very different rates of change and characterized by highly generative properties.
The Figure below displays the top countries with the highest propensity for expansion in cyberspace and identifies their cyber profile type.
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| States ordered by cyber lateral pressure index and identified by cyberprofile, 2015. Source: Choucri and Clark (2019). |
The Figure below presents the logarithmic distribution of the LP Index for the traditional order and for cyberspace, and the inset shows the same in the original metrics. Clearly, the top rankings in lateral pressure, real and cyber, go to China, the United States, and India—in that order. The equalityline in Figure below signals similar propensity for expansion in the cyber and the real domains. States situated above the line are those with greater lateral pressure in cyberspace than in the traditional international arena. States below the equality line demonstrate more lateral pressure in the traditional mode than they do in cyberspace. A closer look enables added, more detailed, inferences pertaining to states and profile type.
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| Comparison of lateral pressure index in real domain, 2016 and cyber domain, 2015. Source: Choucri and Agarwal (2017). (subsequently updated yielding minor changes) |
States with technology dominance in real Profile V (T>R>P) and Profile VI (T>P>R)—such as the United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, and France—are leaders in the cyber domain. By contrast, states with real resource dominance—such as South Africa and Colombia in Profile I (R>P>T) and Russia, Brazil, Canada, Saudi Arabia and Australia in Profile IV (R>T>P) show less propensity for cyber than for real expansion. The same holds for countries for real Profile II: (P>R>T) states whose population dominates, but resources are greater than technology, (as such as Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt. Profile III (P>T>R) countries, also with population dominance, but with technology greater than re sources in real—such as China, India, Mexico, Thailand, and Philippines—exhibit greater lateral pressure in cyberspace than in the traditional world.
On balance, several patterns are noteworthy: First, many states demonstrate different profiles type in the real vs. cyber domain. Second, states also differ in the dominant master variable that is evident in their lateral pressure—real or cyber. Third, with notable exceptions, individual states also differ in the propensity to expand in the real vs. the cyber world. Fourth, it is perhaps to be expected that real technology is the salient factor for lateral pressure in cyberspace. Finally, while these observations are state-based, it is useful to signal some added inferences for the international system as a whole. For example, the cluster situated bottom left of the inset in Figure above situate states with limited, if any, lateral pressure—real or cyber. Concurrently, the correlation coefficient, also in the inset, points to more systemwide (or overall) convergence than divergence lateral pressure, real vs. cyber.
These are the highlights so far. The value of the results lies largely in signaling the properties of one system to theorists of the other system, and helping to clarify ways in which we can explore the interconnections between the "real" and the "virtual" in international interactions at all levels of analysis—from the local to the global.
All of this will be useful in helping us anticipate future trajectories for the Internet, emergent configurations of cyberspace, and the dynamics of cyberpolitics in international relations. Complete results are presented in the book co-authored with David D. Clark titled International Relations in the Cyber Age: The Co-Evolution Dilemma (2018).
References:
- Choucri, N. (2012). Cyberpolitics in international relations. MIT Press.
- Choucri, N., & Agarwal, G. (2017). The theory of lateral pressure: Highlights of quantification and empirical analysis
. In W. R. Thompson (Ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory. Oxford University Press. - Choucri, N., & Clark, D. D. (2019). International relations in the cyber age: The co-evolution dilemma. MIT Press.
- Choucri, N., & North, R. C. (1987). Roots of war: The master variables. In R. Väyrynen, D. Senghaas, & C. Schmidt (Eds.), The Quest for peace: Transcending collective violence and war among societies, cultures, and states (pp. 204–216). International Social Science Council.
In Cyberpolitics in international relations we explore the properties of different types of cyber conflicts and their various manifestations. We recognize that realities on the ground and those in cyber venues can change very rapidly, and that the characteristics of conflict may take on new properties. Our purpose here is only to map cyber conflicts and contentions early in the twenty-first century and to provide a baseline for future analysis.
We also expect that, over time, the nature of cyberpolitics will be charted more fully and the key elements and parameters will be better understood. As a baseline, we explore three broad types of cyber contentions and conflicts: (1) contentions over the architecture of the Internet and the configuration of cyberspace, (2) conflicts in the pursuit of political advantage and economic gain (legal and illegal), and (3) cyber threats to national security. This is an ongoing initiative, one too early to be conclusive.
| Types | Cases | |
|---|---|---|
| I | Contentions over architecture and management of cyberspace | End-to-end argument Layers principal Network neutrality "Code is Law" |
| II | Cyber conflict for political advantage and profit | State power for political control Cyber challenges to the state Competitive politics via cyber venues Cyber crime and cyber espionage |
| III | Cyber threats to national security | Militarization of cyberspace Cyber warfare Cyber threats to infrastructure Cyber terrorism |
| Source: Choucri (2012, 127). | ||
Reference:
- Choucri, N. (2012). Cyberpolitics in international relations. MIT Press.
CyberIR@MIT is a dynamic, interactive, ontology-based knowledge system focused on the evolving, diverse, and complex interconnections of cyberspace and international relations. The knowledge networking system is characterized by (i) user-supporting functionalities, (ii) dedicated to cyber-international relations, governance, conflict and war, and cybersecurity and sustainability, and (iii) based on an evidence-based ontology. The computational logic of the knowledge networking model and method has roots in the Global System for Sustainable Development (GSSD), described in section IV below.
CyberIR@MIT is structured around four global issue-areas or domains, shown at a high-level aggregation below. These issues constitute the high-level "subject-matter," or focus, of our initiative and shape the framework for the system as a whole. Each domain consists of a highly complex system that is near impossible to isolate from another and each includes actors, actions, interactions, and outcomes.
Jointly, they create CyberIR@MIT. Nonetheless, as we move on to the knowledge system and later to ontology matters, their distinctive features become more clear, as do their interconnections.
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| Domains of actors & actions in CyberIRWorld Source: Choucri, Fairman and Agarwal (2022). |
Visit cyberir.mit.edu to explore the ontology, search the current database and contribute to it.
Reference:
- Choucri, N., Fairman, L., & Agarwal, G. (2022). CyberIR@MIT: Knowledge for science, policy, practice (Working Paper No. 2022-9). MIT Political Science Department.
The research that shaped CyberIR was undertaken during the foundational phase, namely, the joint MIT-Harvard Research Project Explorations in Cyber International Relations (ECIR Final Report, 2015). The research design for ECIR is shown in the figure below.
The Joint MIT-Harvard Project provided the scientific foundations for framing how international relations theory can be more responsive to the cyber realities of the 21st century. Sponsored by the U.S. DoD Minerva Initiative between 2009-2014, the vision was to create a new knowledge domain that is multidisciplinary, theory-driven, and technically and empirically anchored such that it:
- clarifies threats and opportunities in cyberspace for national security, welfare, and influence,
- provides analytical tools for understanding and managing transformation and change; and
- attracts and educates a new generation of researchers, scholars, and analysts.
A related objective was to provide the U.S. government and the international community with useful tools and insights into the emergent complexity of the new realities. ECIR adopted an interdisciplinary research strategy, integrating social sciences, computer science, and legal studies. Details, products, and results are available on the project website, here.
Initially framed as an experiment to pull together the capabilities of scholars with very diverse research interests, the emergent vision of the project was based on the assumption that our understanding of 21st century international relations – shaped by interconnections of the "virtual" and "real" – must address a theory of change informed by existing and emergent structures and processes, as well as by underlying regularities of norms and expectations for the management of complexity.
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| ECIR research design. Source: Based on Choucri (2015). |
The integrated results are summarized in the Final Report for Explorations in Cyber International Relations. See the ECIR website for design and results of the individual research projects.
Reference:
- Choucri, N. (2015). Explorations in cyber international relations (Final Program Report ver. 1.2). MIT Political Science Department.